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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 279

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 31/07/1991

Where it occurred: not made available

Country: Kuwait

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: KMOD 20/SER 7

Date of main report: [No date recorded]
Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K3

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: VS50 AP blast

Ground condition: sandy

Date record created: 19/02/2004

Date last modified: 19/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)

Accident report
The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The
following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made
available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in
Kuwait at the time of the accident.
The victim arrived in Kuwait on 10th June 1991, so had only been working there for six weeks
at the time of the accident.
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The victim was a flail operator using a JSFU AARDVARK. At the time to change operators,
the victim walked from the cab in a flailed area, walking in the flail’s tracks. [The “cab” is at the
rear of the machine.]
The “informal SOP” at the time allowed operators not to drive the machine out of the mined
area at changeover times. In this case, the victim tried to change from one track to the other
as his replacement operator and his Team Leader approached. As he changed tracks, he
stood on the ground between the tracks and trod on a VS50 AP mine. The VS50 is overpressure protected (a sustained pressure is needed) and so “resistant” to detonation by flails.
At the time, it was not known whether the flails were 100% effective but the operators and
managers were apparently confident of their abilities. Trials were carried out later and they
confirmed that the flail did not clear 100% of the VS50 mines. The Aardvark flail (as
configured then) was little used after this accident.
Following the accident the Team Leader was dismissed, but later employed again as a
replacement for the victim.
The JSFU Aardvark units were later modified to have a greater rotor speed which was
believed to make them more effective. The actual effectiveness of this was apparently not
satisfactorily demonstrated to the field operatives.

Victim Report
Victim number: 354

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: driver

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Various

Protection used: none

Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because
the SOPs that allowed the victim to walk in areas presumed clear after the passage of the flail
were based on the unfounded belief that live mines were not left in its wake. It was known at
the time that the flails were not 100% effective – especially in sand and when facing overpressure resistant mines. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because
the machine was not suitable to be used in the manner that it was deployed.
SOPs were reported to have later changed to reflect the fact that flailed areas should not be
considered safe, and that a second method of clearance should be employed after the flail.
That its effectiveness had not been objectively assessed prior to deploying the machine as a
primary clearance tool was a significant management failing.
The fact that the Field Supervisor was dismissed and then hired again to take the victim’s
place adds weight to the view that it was not inadequate field supervision that caused the
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accident, but the apparently cavalier attitude of a management pressed for time and eager to
make maximum use of machines.
There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any
reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.
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